沈旭暉論三國
Inventing the RomanticKingdom in its Initial Stages:The Resurrection and Legitimization of the Shu Han Kingdom
Before the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (1 of 4)
Simon Shen
O so vast, O so mighty,
The GreatRiver rolls to sea,
Flowers do waves thrash,
Heroes do sands smash,
When all the dreams drain,
Same are lose and gain
Luo Guanzhong, Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
When the decline of the Roman Empire began after the second century, the demise of Rome’s counterpart in the East, the Han Dynasty of China (206BC-9AD; 25-220AD), was already well into its final stage. Troubled for decades by land annexations, palace rivalries and eunuch politics, the central government of the Eastern Han gradually lost effective control over its territories after the Yellow Turban Rebellion in 184AD. Despite the effort of Cao Cao, the virtual shogun of Han, to hold together some semblance of a united realm, dozens of warlords still seized regional power and competed for land and resources. After the Battle of Red Cliff in 208AD, only three rivals remained, including Caoof the central government himself, as well as his regional competitors Liu Bei and Sun Quan. When Cao died in 220AD, his son Cao Pioverthrew the Eastern Han Dynasty and established the Wei Kingdom. With the establishment of the Shu HanKingdom (221-263AD) by Liu and subsequently the Wu Kingdom (222-280AD) by Sun, the well-known Three Kingdoms era (c.220-265AD) began.
Each of the three kingdoms had vivid characteristics: Wei was situated in the north-central region, the heart of the Han predecessors, with superior military strength; Shu Han, despite having the smallest territory among the three, claimed its ancestry from the Han Dynasty and was antagonistic toward Wei; Wu, in contrast, was a purely regional regime that had little evident ambition in conquering the whole of China. None of the three kingdoms were powerful enough to conquer one another, and the Western Jin Dynasty (265-316AD) ultimately replaced them within decades of their foundation.
Of the three kingdoms, Shu Han attracts the most attention from historians as well as the Chinese populace. Degraded as “bandits” by the dominant Wei regime, Liu Bei and his followers are surprisingly known as heroes, or lesser-gods, to most Chinese people today – with Liu himself portrayed as the benevolent leader, general Guan Yu as the god of war, and chancellor Zhuge Liang as the symbol of the intelligent and resourceful minister. The transformation from bandits to heroes for the Shu Han leaders is not a random interlude in history. Without exaggeration, the long-term mythmaking process has lasted almost two millennia and continues even today, with the kingdom assigned four principal attributes: a force of stability in a chaotic world; a legitimate descendant from the glorious Han Dynasty; a regime ruled by charismatic, benevolent, righteous and intelligent leaders; and finally, an archaic political utopia by which present-day Chinese can reflect their disapproval of contemporary regimes.
Juxtaposed to historic accounts recorded from primary sources, particularly Chen Shou’s biographical history San Guo Zhi (History of the Three Kingdoms) and Sima Guang’s chronicle Zi Zhi Tong Jian (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), the favorable attitude of the Chinese people toward the Shu Han Kingdom is paradoxical – the truths largely contradict the utopian image of the kingdom. In fact, like many of its Sichuanese predecessors and successors, the Shu Han Kingdom was merely a short-lived, small regional regime in the remote Chinese past without a significant cultural or economic legacy. Like many regimes in a divided, chaotic world, the kingdom was also established by Machiavellian strategies and developed a warlike posture that resulted in limited indigenous support.
As revealed by historic evidence, the Shu Han image indeed went through a process of romanticization under which the realities gradually became buried. Of the various primary sources contributing to the romanticized Shu Han images, the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms is easily the most widely-known and popular, with interesting variations such as Fan San Guo Yan Yi (Reverse of the “Romance of the Three Kingdoms”) representing the extreme version of such romanticization. The result has been that most Chinese people have favored the Shu Han Kingdom over many much stronger, longer-lived, and truly national dynasties, such as the Eastern Han or Song Dynasty (960-1127AD).
Owing to an intellectual devotion to study the later stages of romanticization of the Shu Han Kingdom, particularly after the emergence of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, this article only aims to study the mythologization in its earlier stages – i.e. to reshape the artificial resurrection and legitimization of the regime before the sixth century. Without understanding the earlier processes, the easy acceptance of the future Romance would be hard to comprehend. In doing so, the article will attempt to disinter the historic truths that contrast with the myth in the following sections.
Application of the Romanticization
Before jumping into the details, we have to well acknowledge the romanticization was motivated by political, diplomatic, ideological and social calculations in a concerted effort. Dismantling the myth, or “returning mythic heroes to historic figures” as cultural scholar Jin Ze suggests, might be painful to some admirers. But the search for historic truths might nonetheless motivate people to further explore hidden knowledge about their past, and serve as a microcosm for better understanding Chinese history, politics, society and culture in several ways. Most strikingly, the romanticization presents a classic example of the long-term distortion of primary sources by a secondary effort involving a large number of people living in different periods of time. The persistence of Shu Han’s elevated status, coupled with its paltry long-term impact on history, remains a prime example of the power of historical mythmaking.
Indeed, imitation of an idealized Shu Han image sometimes influenced actual historic events. Many historic figures who explicitly modeled themselves on the Shu Han heroes unexpectedly failed to succeed in the same way the former were believed to have, or even suffered from political or military fiascoes. For instance, General Guo Ni of the Southern Song Dynasty (1128-1279D) imitated the wise Zhuge Liang’s style of dress and used mu niu liu ma (the wooden oxen and the rolling horses), Zhuge’s mechanical tools for transportation ten centuries earlier. Guo’s army was totally defeated by the Jurchens, and he has been nicknamed the “Zhuge Liang with tears (dai zhi Zhuge Liang)” by Taiwanese revisionist historian Bai Yang. Without understanding the whole process of romanticization, historians cannot fully explain the repeated, if often peripheral, imitation of ancient figures by the Chinese people.
In the past, some historians have suggested that ancient China was a hierarchical world with limited social mobility. Sociologist Max Weber labeled China a “feudal and prebendal state” that rarely permitted inter-class movements. Although the Weberian characterization is no longer accepted at face value, the transfiguration of the Shu Han image still poses a forceful challenge against rigid structural interpretations of Chinese culture. It demonstrates a mixture of elitist and popular culture, as the mythmaking features both state sponsorship and broadened participation by ordinary people. In other words, the Shu Han mythologization was not strictly manipulated from the top-down or the bottom-up, but by a mixture of both, and has in that sense contributed to a national sense of cultural unity.
In tying the myth to its application today, the popular perception of history and the actual political agenda are undoubtedly still intertwined in China. Understanding the former can at times enable political scientists to predict the latter. For example, in 1999, ex-Premier Zhu Rongji openly credited Emperor Yong Zheng (1722-1735AD) of the Qing Dynasty in order to emphasize his determination to promote reforms parallel with those of the Qing emperor. As a result, Zhu created a fashion in China for glorifying Yong Zheng that was viewed as a popular support for the anti-corruption campaign. By the same token, the projection of the contemporary Shu Han image into the actual political arena may enable scholars to discern popular political sentiments. Continued widespread interest in the Shu Han heroes, for instance, might imply a strong desire for a non-corrupted, righteous Chinese regime. (1 of 4)
http://youthroundtable.org/html/admin/Newsletter036.htm Inventing the RomanticKingdom in its Initial Stages:
The Resurrection and Legitimization of the Shu Han Kingdom
Before the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (2 of 4)
Simon Shen
II. Resurrection
As we have come across, the image of the Shu Han Kingdom after its immediate collapse was nothing but a temporal and regional political entity. The whole process of romanticizion was started in a low profile manner in the fourth century. After its unification of China, the Western Jin Dynasty soon faced the challenges of decentralization and non-ethnic Han rebellions. From 311 to 316AD, the minority Xiongnu captured both Loyang and Changan, the Jin capitals, resulting in the collapse of the dynasty and the beginning of the period of disunion (c.317-383AD). The Jin royalty continued their reign in the southeast (known as the Eastern Jin Dynasty, 317-420AD), while other areas of China fell under the control of roughly sixteen kingdoms. According to Huang Fanguang, a Chinese scholar focusing on this period, historians are hard-pressed to understand the domestic policies of these brief kingdoms because of the disappearance of primary sources. As a result, most scholars have not realized that the Shu Han myth originated as early as the fourth century, resulting in the understandable unfamiliarity of stage one to most people. In fact, this period laid the foundation for the future transfiguration of the Shu Han image because it helped prolong the regime even if only in name. Although the designers in this stage were not typically supporters of Shu Han, their practices distinguished the kingdom from its regional predecessors and successors, initiating a legend with unintended consequences.
Because the legacy of the Shu Han Kingdom was still vivid in the minds of contemporaries after Jin fell in the north, some insurgent kings purposefully forged links between themselves and the Shu Han leaders, or even claimed direct kinship with the Liu family, leading Liu Bei to become their spiritual co-founders. Two different strategies for using the Shu Han image can be distinguished. The first was devised by rulers seeking national appeal for their regimes, such as the Xiongnu leader Liu Yuan who founded the Han-Zhao Kingdom in 304AD.
Although Han-Zhao comprised only less than a third of the northern region of China, including Loyang and Changan (see map 2), Liu Yuan still aimed at replacing the Jin Dynasty and unifying China. In order to attract popular support, gain favor from the ethnic Chinese, and challenge the legitimate status of the Jin Dynasty, Liu Yuan awkwardly linked his Xiongnu ancestry with the Han emperors and named his new kingdom “Han.” Liu’s self-identification as a Han descendant was based on the following logic: the Xiongnu leader shared the same surname with Han royalty, Liu, because one Xiongnu ancestor had married a Han princess four centuries ago – which was ironically a shameful story to Liu Bang, the founder of the Western Han Dynasty (206BC-9AD). As the Xiongnu king proudly told his ministers,
The Han Dynasty has lasted for a long time and has granted lots of merits to the people. I am the nephew of the Han descendants. As the Eastern Han has demised, why can’t I succeed the Han throne?
As a symbiotic side-effect, Liu Bei, the Shu Han founder claiming the same family membership, was naturally welcomed to Liu Yuan’s arbitrary ancestor list. Without the tangible legacy within the Shu Han region, Liu Yuan relied on official and religious ceremonies linking him and his alleged Han ancestors. As recorded in the Zi Zhi Tong Jian, when Liu Yuan formally founded his kingdom,
officially honored Liu Chin, the last Shu Han ruler, as “Emperor Xiao Huai”; built three main royal temples to worship Liu Bang, Liu Xiu and Liu Bei as the “Three Great Ancestors (san zhu)”; and constructed five lesser temples to worship the “Five Lesser Ancestors (wu zong).”
This is the first known record in history paralleling Liu Bei with the founders of the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties. More important, the status of Liu Bei in the Han-Zhao temple was placed even higher than that of many genuine Han emperors, such as the famous Emperor Wu (141-87BC). Thus, a symbolic Shu Han resurrection was unconsciously prompted by Liu Yuan’s efforts, by which the Shu Han rulers were posthumously legitimized as heirs to the Han Dynasty.
The Badi minority leader, Li Xiong, who founded Shu Han’s regional successor, the Cheng-Han Kingdom (304-347AD), made another calculation. Establishing his kingdom in Sichuan, Li Xiong had no evident ambition to expand his kingdom beyond the Shu Han boundaries (see map 2). Unlike the Xiongnu, who dreamed of unifying China, the Badi were content to control Sichuan alone as a regional power. The Shu Han experience thus became a historic justification for the existence of a new Sichuan regime, and a recent precedent to inculcate indigenous Sichuan people with separatist sentiments. By paralleling itself with Shu Han, Cheng-Han succeeded in maintaining its regional hegemony with little territorial ambition for thirty years, as other powers neither recognized nor focused on it.
Because the regional appeal of the Badi has not attracted much historic focus, unlike the straightforward Han-Zhao ancestor-hunt, historians often neglect the Cheng-Han contribution to the Shu Han myth. In fact, the Cheng-Han policies aroused indigenous Sichuan separatist sentiment by substantially continuing or, more correctly, modifying the Shu Han legacy in the region. When the kingdom was founded, Li Xiong explicitly imitated the Shu Han policies in ruling Sichuan, such as appointing a Zhuge Liang-type hermit, Fan Chengsun – who was born in Zhuge’s time – as his chancellor. As recorded in the Jin Shu (History of the Jin Dynasty), Cheng-Han rulers also reintroduced the Shu Han chancellor’s internal legal reform in the territories to portray a continuation of regional policy, even if the policy was not welcomed by landlords in either regime. For instance, Li Xiong confiscated lands owned by the gentry and nobility, and forbade illegal land annexations that were commonly practiced in the Eastern Jin Dynasty. Such reforms were compatible with Zhuge’s attempt to use legal measures to promote the dignity of government in 214AD, including strict military and taxation laws, as he openly confessed,
I use the laws to scare people today, because people will know the grandiosity of the government when the laws are effectively enforced.
Moreover, although not explicitly documented by historic records, the preservation of Shu Han sites and relics during the period of disunion should probably be credited to the subsequent Sichuan regimes, including Cheng-Han. Famous Shu Han relics, including the palace of the White Emperor City, Zhuge Liang Temple and Liu Bei Temple, were extant for later poetic romanticization, and are still present today. The indigenous people were thus enabled to continue visiting and memorializing their old rulers, leaving the veneration of Shu Han leaders undisturbed even down to the twentieth century, as visitors have observed.
As an eventual U-turn, Cheng-Han also euphemistically imitated Han-Zhao’s ancestor-seeking propaganda. Because Li Shou, the fourth Cheng-Han emperor, was dissatisfied with the limited territorial achievements of his Badi ancestors, he turned to model himself on Emperor Wu of the Western Han Dynasty and switched his nation’s focus from regional interests to the unification of China. Thus, he renamed his country from Cheng to Han in 338AD, naturally including Liu Bei and his son Liu Chan in his remote ancestor list. Ironically, Li Shou’s ambitious pretension burdened his small country, resulting in the annexation of Cheng-Han by Eastern Jin in 347AD.
Viewed from another angle, Shu Han was fortunate to have the period of disunion following within half a century of its collapse, because popular history is often distorted, especially by accounts exaggerating the merits of the founding emperors and the evils of the last emperors. Owing to “the interdepartmental obstructionism that is always inseparable from bureaucracy,” as British sinologist Denis Twitchett observed, Chinese official historians faced restrictions in providing objective biographies. The fate of other Sichuan regimes, among other regional dynasties, frequently demonstrated their diminished historic status. The principalities of Ba and Shu in the Warring-States era (403-221BC), for example, lasted for hundreds of years, but their histories were said to have been destroyed in the book burning ordeal of the Qin Dynasty (220-206BC) after earlier being involuntarily incorporated by the Qin state. The little-know Cheng Jia Kingdom (25-36AD) ruled Sichuan for eleven years during the founding years of the Eastern Han Dynasty, but even its status as a regional regime was thoroughly omitted by most historians.
Thus, if the Jin Dynasty had lasted for a century or centuries more, perhaps the Shu Han Kingdom would reasonably have followed the historic paths of Ba, Shu and Cheng Jia. In fact, the Jin Dynasty did try to eliminate the Sichuan regional veneration of the old Shu Han leaders and modify the Shu Han history by several measures. As a humiliating posture, the last Shu Han emperor, Liu Chan – who became a synonym for a foolish ruler by later historians –was put under house arrest in Loyang after his kingdom was destroyed. Chen Shou revealed Liu’s humble position in the Jin court:
Liu Chan was asked to move his whole royal family to Loyang. The Jin emperor told him, “… Now you become the Duke of Anle of our dynasty. As you cared about your people and surrendered to our great dynasty, your land is now safe… I really appreciate your decision!”
Moreover, in writing the history of Shu Han for the Jin royalty, Chen deliberately camouflaged Wei’s inability to defeat the Shu Han army, and exaggerated the setbacks of Shu Han policies. Russian literary scholar Boris Riftin even suggested that Chen made some personal attacks on the son of Zhuge Liang in the San Guo Zhi:
The Sichuan people memorialized Zhuge Liang, thus crediting his son, Zhuge Zhan, with most of the government decisions of other ministers after Zhuge Liang’s death. However, Zhuge Zhan was mediocre, his reputation was credited much more than he deserved.
Riftin suggested that the way Chen criticized the heir of Zhuge Liang as the over-assessed noble might be Chen’s personal revenge made to the Zhuge family, because the son of Zhuge Liang had once punished Chen when Chen was serving the Shu Han government. Riftin, of course, believed that Zhuge Zhan was not a mediocre.
Lastly, we can assess the importance of the resurrection of Shu Han by contrasting its fate with that of the contemporary Wu Kingdom. Wu was militarily stronger and territorially larger than Shu Han, but later regional rulers never used it for political messages, perhaps because its territory was fully occupied by the subsequent Eastern Jin Dynasty, which had no need to forge a new ancestry for national appeal fifty years after its foundation. Wu’s strong regional stance and lack of unifying ambitions also discouraged regimes from appealing to the entire nation to claim it as their predecessor. Thus, because of the aloof attitude of insurgent rulers toward it, in contrast to Shu Han, the Wu Kingdom was not a candidate for romanticization in Chinese history.
* * *
Sadly, both images of Shu Han credited to the Xiongnu and the Badi, the legitimate national government and the indigenous regional hegemon, respectively, did not match the historic facts in the Three Kingdoms era. Here the article will explain the exiled nature of the Shu Han Kingdom and its distinction from an indigenous regional regime, and will reserve arguments against the asserted nationwide Shu Han legitimacy for the next stage.
Although contemporary historian Ray Huang explains the division of the Three Kingdoms by his term “geopolitics,” suggesting Sichuan was already isolated from central China in the third century, the Shu Han regime was in fact alien to the indigenous people. Although the Shu Han policies were imitated by the later Sichuan regime of Cheng-Han, they were in fact dictatorial orders issued by outsiders from the region. Already noticed in the Cheng-Han Kingdom by some officials, although not agreed with by the royalty, participation of indigenous Sichuan people in the Shu Han government was negligible. When Kung Zhuang persuaded Li Shou, the fourth Cheng-Han ruler, to hire more indigenous Sichuan people in the government, he reminded Li of Shu Han’s alien posture to the Sichuan people:
Please refer to the historic example:… when Liu Bei ruled Sichuan, those in power were coming from the north and the east. Sadly, when Shu Han was conquered, most outsiders were slaughtered.
In fact, indigenous people of the Shu Han Kingdom were not too satisfied, as implied by Qiao Zhou, one of the few Sichuan elites serving in the Shu Han government. In his Essay on Enemy Kingdoms petitioned to Liu Chan in 257AD, Qiao warned the last Shu Han emperor,
Riots will break out when people can no longer tolerate their current hardships; the country will collapse when the ministers don’t care about the people, and the officials are brutal to citizens…If wars are constant, and a mishap comes, even the wisest will be unable to show the way of safety.
Switching sides to serve the Jin government after the collapse of Shu Han, Qiao, representing indigenous interests, was already discontent over the Shu Han regime. The description in his petition implied that with a primary focus on external warfare against the Wei Kingdom, Shu Han rarely set any long-term goals in developing Sichuan except extracting the region’s resources to expand its territories. Some Sichuan landlords also resented the Shu Han distrust toward them in government, as shown by how the strict social control imposed by Zhang Yi, the Yunnan governor-general, stirred up the Lao Zhou rebellion in 231AD. The Shu Han control over Sichuan was indeed fragile, as proven by the gesture of local elites who did not provide any support to the regime when the Wei army besieged Chongqing in 263AD. As the leading indigenous scholar, Qiao was even the first Shu Han official to propose surrender.
In short, the Shu Han regime was only an exiled government based temporarily in Sichuan, dominated by elites coming from present-day Hunan and Gansu, not caring much about the region at all. “Governors, but no government,” suggested Japanese historian Hisayuki Miyakawa, correctly noting that “the attitude of the native southern subjects was conditioned by the individual character of the local official.” Just as few historians would argue that the Nationalist government’s temporary settlement in Sichuan during WWII (1937-1945AD) was a beneficial interlude for the indigenous Sichuan people, the position of the Shu Han regime was indeed similar.
Nevertheless, the combined Xiongnu glorification and the Badi continuation of Zhuge Liang’s legacy rescued Shu Han from possible disappearance. Without attempts to link Shu Han with other indigenous powers in the period of disunion, the Sichuan people would not have developed fond memories toward the regime for long. By the same token, without gestures equating Liu Bei with the same historic status as Liu Bang, such good feelings would have been impossible to extend to China as a whole. Although Cheng-Han and Han-Zhao collapsed in a matter of decades, the image of Shu Han among fellow Chinese was nonetheless reinstated, if not yet romanticized; such a reinstatement was vital for the next stage of the mythmaking process. (2of4)
http://youthroundtable.org/html/admin/Newsletter037.htm o shit..
有無中文 finished..
講蜀對後世既影響多d... Originally posted by stephenlion at 2005-3-13 10:09 PM:
o shit..
有無中文
無......:icon088: Originally posted by 橙色力量 at 2005-3-13 23:15:
無......:icon088:
oh my god..
每日睇兩段為目標:o Originally posted by ar U at 2005-3-13 11:16 PM:
oh my god..
每日睇兩段為目標:o
好快睇完jei 概括幾點：
一、蜀漢本身只是一個地方軍閥勢力，但是後世對劉備、諸葛亮以至關羽卻是推崇備致。原因在於蜀漢被「浪漫化/神化」了
二、蜀漢成為被浪漫化的對象，主要上是政治上的需要
甲、匈奴人劉淵在東晉時期提出自己姓劉，與劉邦、劉秀、劉備等人有淵源，藉以號召人民支持自己推翻東晉。劉備的地位因而大為提升
乙、當時分裂的勢力之一「成漢」的領導人藉口自己與蜀漢一脈相承，在四川區內保持政權約三十年
三、因為這種分裂、動盪的局勢，蜀漢在歷史上的形象有了市場。
四、陳壽撰寫《三國志》時，抑蜀揚魏，與其被諸葛亮之子諸葛瞻處分有關
五、蜀漢長年征戰，實際上並無長遠發展國家目標，更得不到國內人民、地主支持。
六、蜀漢大臣譙周曾經提出諫言，要顧及人民的生活。但建議似乎不被採納，結果在魏國攻陷蜀漢的時候，譙周率先提出投降。 Originally posted by 沉睡的藍 at 2005-3-14 05:47:
概括幾點：
一、蜀漢本身只是一個地方軍閥勢力，但是後世對劉備、諸葛亮以至關羽卻是推崇備致。原因在於蜀漢被「浪漫化/神化」了
二、蜀漢成為被浪漫化的對象，主要上是政治上的需要
甲、匈奴人劉淵在東晉時 ...
thz:icon069: Originally posted by ar U at 2005-3-14 07:15 PM:
thz:icon069:
thx2:icon101::icon074: 六、蜀漢大臣譙周曾經提出諫言，要顧及人民的生活。但建議似乎不被採納，結果在魏國攻陷蜀漢的時候，譙周率先提出投降。:icon099::icon099::icon099:
:icon010: Originally posted by grandoni at 15-3-2005 05:05 PM:
六、蜀漢大臣譙周曾經提出諫言，要顧及人民的生活。但建議似乎不被採納，結果在魏國攻陷蜀漢的時候，譙周率先提出投降。:icon099::icon099::icon099:
:icon010:
佢係當時唯一敢反對孔明北伐ge人 Originally posted by 雲摩格比 at 2005-3-15 11:24 PM:
佢係當時唯一敢反對孔明北伐ge人
蜀派大佬嘛 Originally posted by stephenlion at 15-3-2005 11:51 PM:
蜀派大佬嘛
李嚴先係大佬
冇人敢撐譙周:icon099:
佢其實都係為人民著想 Originally posted by 雲摩格比 at 2005-3-16 02:09 AM:
李嚴先係大佬
冇人敢撐譙周:icon099:
佢其實都係為人民著想
個時李嚴去左喇 Originally posted by stephenlion at 16-3-2005 06:26 AM:
個時李嚴去左喇
我以為你話反戰個時添:o Originally posted by 雲摩格比 at 2005-3-16 09:25 PM:
我以為你話反戰個時添:o
is ok la:) Originally posted by 雲摩格比 at 2005-3-16 02:09 AM:
李嚴先係大佬
冇人敢撐譙周:icon099:
佢其實都係為人民著想
佢係有大一統的思想,同張昭一樣............
俾2篇野大家睇下
劉禪（阿斗）在位第41年（公元263年），曹魏大將鄧艾率軍兵臨成都，大臣譙周力主投降，後主聽從，蜀漢滅亡。譙周從此被罵到臭頭。史學家李則芬指責說：「譙周實為中國歷史上公然為文投降的第一個漢奸。」
譙周該不該罵？該不該用「漢奸」之名責罵？（還真的可能是漢奸，蜀漢的國號是「漢」，不是「蜀」或「蜀漢」。）
當魏兵攻來，危急存亡之際，當時的確有其他臣子提出力挽狂瀾或趨吉避凶之道，諸如流亡到吳國或到南中避難，都被譙周一一駁斥。
譙周反對投靠東吳
主張投奔東吳的人認為，東吳是盟國，不會見死不救。
譙周反對。他說：「自古以來，沒有寄居他國，還能當皇帝的事。要逃往吳國，一定得稱臣投降才行。而且大國併吞小國，是很正常的，很顯然，魏能吞吳，吳不能吞魏（魏大吳小）。同樣要低頭稱臣，與其向小國稱臣，不如向大國。與其受辱兩次，不如受辱一次就好（投降是羞辱的事）。」
譙周的論點很明確，流亡到人家家裡還想繼續當天子，痴人說夢。要稱臣，一次就好，吳國早晚會向魏國投降。既然如此，何不一開始就向魏國投降，比較省事？
譙周反對投奔南中
吳國不行，那麼南中如何？南中約為今日雲南，總共七個郡，曾在諸葛亮七擒孟獲等戰役中被收服。此區山脈險峻，與外隔絕，易守難攻，戰略位置極好，可以投奔。
譙周認為為時已晚，要奔往南中，必須早點籌畫，如今大敵當前，人心離散，士卒小吏心裡想什麼，誰也不知道，只怕中途叛變。
東吳一案很快便淘汰出局，但後主劉禪仍猶疑於要不要退入南中。
譙周再度反對，主要理由是：南中是遠方蠻族，平常不貢奉，還多次反叛，丞相諸葛亮南征後，他們勢窮力盡才服從。若蜀漢政權遷移南中，他們要供給物資、兵力，負擔加重，必生怨恨，恐怕會再度反叛。況且魏軍入蜀後還會向南一路追擊。
劉禪愈聽愈寒心，決定投降。
死守待援，可不可行？
譙周的議論不能說沒有道理，投奔東吳或南中都不是好主意。而死守成都，等待救援呢？似乎不被蜀漢君臣所考慮。但是大將軍姜維、劉禪的五子劉諶都不放棄，即使困獸之鬥也要拚死一搏。譙周主降，是好點子或餿主意？關鍵恐怕在此。如果魏滅蜀成定局，早日投降，免於殺戮，少一些抵抗，少一些傷亡，不也美事一件，功德一樁？反之，明明大有可為，卻提早棄絕，就太沒志氣、太沒骨氣了。
譙周乃至後主，是哪一種？
當時直接威脅成都的，是鄧艾所的西路軍。鄧艾率領精兵，翻山越嶺，七百里杳無人煙，鑿山開路，遇水架橋，兵抵江油。江油守意想不到天降神兵，束手就摛。
鄧艾後來擊破諸葛瞻大軍，兵抵雒縣（今四川廣漢），逼近成都，這時蜀軍根本沒有任何兵力可以還擊，因為料不到魏軍會攻進國土，軍隊都已調到前線應敵，大後方並無戒備。百姓逃到山林大澤，人心惶惶，場面混亂。這是劉禪決定投降的背景。
為什麼不等待救援呢？誰能來救？放眼望去，只有姜維。姜維人在哪裡？在劍閣，和鍾會率領的曹魏主力東路軍對峙。鍾會遭到牽制，糧運有不濟之虞，有意退兵，若不是鄧艾從陰平道出奇兵，曹魏可能無功而退。
偏偏時勢就這麼微妙，鄧艾出其不意，蜀漢陷入第一個燃眉之急。諸葛瞻戰術保守，不能主動截擊，讓鄧艾長驅直入，兵臨雒縣，蜀漢陷入第二個燃眉之急。此時姜維固然牽制住鍾會的二十萬大軍，但相對的，姜維也被鍾會牽制住，當姜維馳援成都，鍾會一面推進到涪城（四川綿陽），一面派兵追擊姜維。姜維接獲來自朝廷的投降指令，全軍憤恨不已，卻也是孤臣無力可回天。
有史家認為，鄧艾孤軍深入，外無救援，鍾會大軍受阻於劍閣，後主堅守成都，鄧艾會成為甕中之鱉。呂思勉先生即持此看法。這是錯誤的。第一個，說鄧艾孤軍深入，外無救援，這是對的，但正因為外無救援，形成孫子兵法說的「死地」，拚戰的決心堅強，和蜀漢鬥志低落，恰成強烈對比。第二個，鍾會不能動彈，是因為姜維阻擋，當姜維移動援救成都，鍾會也跟著解套，追擊姜維，到時候，誰是甕，誰是鱉，還不曉得呢！
蜀漢已無反擊的本錢
魏軍伐蜀，沒想到這麼好打，也沒想到這麼難打。說好打，比如進入漢中。依照司馬昭的原定計畫，是要把姜維困在他所駐守的沓中（甘肅省舟曲縣西北），讓姜維留在西境，不能照顧東方，魏軍襲擊漢中，拿下幾座邊城，逼使劉禪主動投降。因此鍾會率領的東路軍，是主力部隊，有十餘萬人，鄧艾、諸葛緒各領三萬人，走西線，牽制姜維。
蜀漢採堅守策略，守住漢、樂兩座大城，不出戰。鍾會分兵直驅陽安關，因為蜀軍內叛，而輕鬆攻取。
沒想到陽安關這麼好攻。其實早在魏軍發動攻勢之前，姜維聽說鍾會在關中一帶練兵，可能覬覦漢中，便奏請劉禪加派兵力，東守陽安關，西護陰平橋頭。但劉禪寵信宦官黃皓。黃皓相信鬼神巫術，堅認魏軍不會來犯，於是全國過著太平日子，沒有敵情觀念。
到此為止，情勢對魏軍很有利，卻嚴重低估姜維的機動作戰能力。姜維先是用計擺脫諸葛緒，越過陰平橋頭，再趕到劍閣，抵禦鍾會，形成對峙。這就是前面說的「沒想到這麼難打。」
縱使劉禪死守，最後還是死而不守，姜維趕來也沒有用。從君臣到百姓，厭戰怕戰，沒有扭轉乾坤的本錢。後人如孫盛以田單、勾踐復國為期許，究竟陳義過高。當時民生凋弊、黃皓當道的蜀漢已無這樣的條件。
或許譙周看透了這一點，所以乾脆主張投降，不必造成不必要的傷亡。說他不勇敢也可以，說他沒志氣也可以，但說他什麼漢奸不奸的，可能太過了。他力主投降是沒錯，卻也是在朝廷開會的君臣最後一致同意的。
不可諱言，譙周是失敗主義者，他精通命理，早就明說，天命在魏，蜀到劉禪這一代就已經玩完了。不過不少人拿譙周的《仇國論》來大作文章，證明他罪大惡極（如王夫之），甚至猜想譙周拿了魏國的好處，是內賊，這樣栽贓是不公平的。 曹魏揮軍蜀漢，兵臨城下，譙周主張投降，反對轉進南中，反對流亡東吳。如此堅定的主降，是因為衡量形勢，知道無力反擊，不如投降，保全國家？或是未卜先知，自知氣數已盡，不必玩了？
當塗高是啥咪碗糕？
依譙周的學養、背景，他不盡然了解行軍布陣，恐怕很難研判有多少力挽狂瀾的機率，但確知蜀漢輸定了，憑什麼？憑他的卜算能力，憑他堅信不疑的「當塗高」。
當塗高是西漢末年流傳的讖文，什麼意思，沒幾個人懂得。有個益州人叫周舒，做過一番解釋，當時有人拿《春秋讖》裡一句「代漢者，當塗高」來問他，周舒答說：「當塗高者，魏也。」（《三國志·周群傳》）
為什麼是魏？周舒未詳加註解，但「當塗高者，魏也」這句話便傳開了。後來譙周向杜瓊請教其中緣故。杜瓊和周舒一樣，精通神秘學，識天機，達人事。杜瓊解釋這句話說：「魏，闕名也，當塗而高。」
再說明白點。「魏」，是皇宮門口兩旁高大的瞭望平台，又稱魏闕。因為正當道路，所以說是「當塗高。」（塗，通【途】，路途的意思。）
代漢者，當途高，取代漢朝的，是道路中的高物，那就是魏闕，曹魏政權是也。
譙周還是想不透為什麼是曹魏取代漢朝？他繼續請教杜瓊。
杜瓊從「曹」這個字解釋起：「自古稱呼官職不說『曹』。漢朝以來，都稱官府機構為『曹』，下級辦事官員叫『屬曹』，官府勤務兵叫『侍曹』。『屬曹』、『侍曹』不就是屬於曹氏、侍奉曹氏的意思嗎？」
「這是天意啊！」杜瓊補上一句。
看天空看出天機來
杜瓊這個人和前面提到的周舒，同樣以未卜先知著稱，但路子不太相同。周舒很會觀察雲氣（這叫「候氣」）。觀察雲氣，是秦、漢方士的超級本事，能夠觀察雲氣的形狀、色彩，預測人事吉凶。周舒把這套本領傳給兒子周群。周群在庭院蓋了一座小樓，派奴婢上樓值班觀望，發現雲氣，趕緊報告，周群再上樓觀察判讀。據說透過這個管道所做的吉凶預言，大多應驗。
杜瓊卻不興這一套。他不觀察天象，因為難度太高，又必須親自觀看，辨識形狀顏色，不能採信他人轉述，很累人。萬一洩露天機，又會惹禍，不如不用。
不過杜瓊的「說文解字」能力堪稱一絕，可惜並未傳授任何人，包括親生兒子。譙周很想學會這項本領，就用土法煉鋼的方式，自行揣摩，研究其中奧妙。比如，他讀《左傳》，讀到晉穆侯把長子命名為「仇」，（晉穆侯當時打了敗仗，為了雪恥，這年生的兒子取名為「仇」。）卻把次子命名為「成師」。（當時打了勝仗，這年生的兒子取名為「成師」，表示出師成功。）有位晉國官員大表不解，認為把太子取名為「仇」，次子倒叫做「成師」，這是禍亂的徵兆，哥哥恐怕會被取代。
歷史證明，晉穆侯死後，太子仇未能順利繼位，王位被叔叔篡奪，太子仇流亡在外，四年後才以武力奪回王位。是為晉文侯。
而成師雖然沒有王位繼承權，但受封的領土比國君還大，經過祖孫三代，七十三年後，他的孫子輩終於奪得王位。
譙周又舉一個例子：漢靈帝把兩個兒子取名為史侯、董侯。這個「侯」字取壞了。果然，史侯、董侯起先當上皇帝，後來都被廢為諸侯。從皇帝貶為侯，命運就寫在他們的名字裡。（史侯就是漢少帝劉辯，被董卓罷免；董侯就是漢獻帝劉協，被曹丕罷黜。）
劉禪的名字取壞了
譙周舉一反三，為蜀漢兩位君王算命。──劉備的「備」是「具有」的意思，而劉禪的「禪」是「授與」的意思。這表示說劉氏已經具有了，應該授與他人。譙周說：「這比晉穆侯、漢靈帝為兩個兒子命名的個案，還要明顯。」
姓名既已顯露天機，接下來任何奇奇怪怪的現象，就不難比附，強化劉氏將把政權交出去的論點。有一次，皇宮大樹無緣無故折斷，譙周發現事有蹊蹺，又不好明講，便在柱子寫下十二個大字：「眾而大，期之會，具而授，若何復？」
這十二字真言要說什麼？原來，「曹」的含義是「眾多」，而「魏」一如前述，是「高大的闕」，所以「眾而大」就是「曹魏」；「期之會」指天下歸聚於曹魏統治之下；「具而授」的「具」是影射劉備，「授」是影射劉禪，「具而授」就是具有之後就要授給他人；這樣怎麼會有繼位的君王呢？「若何復」即這意思。
蜀漢滅亡後，譙周預言成真，人家問他是怎麼預知的。譙周答道：「雖然我自己推究出這些答案，但我是依循杜瓊先生的言辭去推論的，並沒什麼創新的地方。」
說譙周穿鑿附會也好，說譙周先知先覺也好，反正他早已認定曹魏將取代漢朝，而蜀漢政權支撐不久。於是魏軍攻進益州本土，譙周義無反顧，全力主張投降。在譙周的中心思想裡，失敗主義瀰漫，但若有史學者質疑譙周內神通外鬼、勾結曹魏，恐怕錯怪他了。 根本唔洗咩占算天命
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